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Monopoly bundling in cyberspace:
how many products does
Microsoft sell?

BY ALAN J. MEESE*

I. Introduction
Microsoft has required firms that purchase its operating system to
take other software from it as well. 1 More precisely, Microsoft
requires firms that manufacture personal computers (original
equipment manufacturers or OEMs) to purchase Internet Explorer
(!E)-Microsoft's Internet browser-if they desire a license to
"pre-load" the company's Windows operating system (OS) on per-

* Associate Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law.
Conversations with Peter Alces and Trotter Hardy were
useful in preparing this article. Lawrence Lessig provided helpful comments on earlier drafts.
AUTHOR'S NOTE:

This article refers throughout to Microsoft's "bundle" of Windows
and Internet Explorer. Choice of this or similar terminology, of course, is
not meant to evince any preconception that the two items are separate
products for the purpose of tying doctrine.
0 1999 by Federal Legal Publications. Inc
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sonal computers (PCs) before they are sold to consumers. 2 At one
time, this requirement was technological in nature. Microsoft supplied Windows 95 and Internet Explorer 3.0 on the same master
disk, and the former would not function unless the latter was also
installed. 3 Moreover, once IE was installed, deletion of it would
disable the operating system. 4 Subsequently, the requirement
became contractual in nature, as Microsoft required OEMs to purchase IE 4.0, which was supplied separately, as a condition of
licensing Windows 95.5
More recently, the requirement has again become technological, as Microsoft has released a new version of its operating system, Windows 98. Installation of Windows 98 necessarily entails
installation of Internet Explorer 4.0, and deletion of the software
code that performs the browser function will, according to
Microsoft, degrade the operating system. 6 Moreover, once OEMs
2
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 940-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cas.1]72,261,
pp. 82,671-72 (D. D.C. 1998).

Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 940-41.
4

/d.

s This contractual requirement took alternate forms. Initially,
Microsoft distributed IE 4.0 on a separate CD ROM, and amended its
Windows 95 license agreements to require OEMs to ship the CD with
personal computers. Soon thereafter, the agreements were again
amended, only this time to require OEMs to install IE 4.0 before shipment. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 940-41; United States v. Microsoft, 980
F. Supp. 537, 544 (D.D.C. 1997).
6
See Microsoft Corporation's Memorandum in Support of Its
Motion for Summary Judgment 32, No. 98-1232 (D. D.C. August 10,
1998). This document appears at <www .microsoft.com/presspass/doj/810summjf.htm>. Citations herein are to that document. In a declaration
filed under seal, Edward W. Felten, a computer scientist retained by the
United States, purportedly describes how to remove browser functionality
from the operating system without damaging the latter. See Microsoft,
1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,673 n.11 (describing declaration's assertions to
this effect). It is not clear, however, that the procedure described by the
government actually removes the browser or, instead, simply denies the
user access to it. !d. See also notes 166-68 infra and accompanying text.
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have purchased Windows 98/IE, they must insure that it is readily
available to consumers. 7 For example, contracts between Microsoft
and aEMs prevent the manufacturers from removing the IE icon
from the screen that consumers encounter when they boot up their
PCs for the first time. 8 Further, while OEMs remain free to purchase and install competing browsers, they must not give such
browsers greater prominence on the computer desktop than they
give to IE.9 Thus, even if OEMs believe that, say, Netscape's
browser is superior to Microsoft's, they must purchase the latter
and make it readily available to consumers.
The government has not taken kindly to either bundle. In the
fall of 1997 the Department of Justice challenged the Windows
95/IE combination, arguing that it offended a 1994 consent decree
prohibiting Microsoft from licensing its Windows OS on the condition that purchasers take other application software as well. 10
7
See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,673-74 (referring to
Microsoft's contractual restriction on "unbundling" the browser from the
operating system).

s See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,677, 82,673-74. Removal
of the icon, it should be noted, does not delete or otherwise affect the
software code that provides browser functionality. See Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 6, at 32-34. This
was also the case with Microsoft's combination of Windows 95 and IE
3.0 and 4.0. Moreover, while the Windows 95/IE bundles contained an
"add/remove" utility, the Windows 98/IE bundle has no such utility. At
any rate, it appears that "removal" of IE does not, in fact, delete the software code that constitutes the application, but instead disables it until
recalled. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 941 ("It appears to be undisputed that
[removing the icon and running 'add/remove'] do not remove the IE software code, which indeed continues to play a role in providing nonbrowser functionality.").
9
Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,677 (noting that contractual
restrictions prevent OEMs from "creat[ing] icons or folders larger than
those placed by Microsoft").

See Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. at passim (entertaining government's
petition for civil contempt and preliminary injunction); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (approving decree); 59
Fed. Reg. 59,426 (Nov. 17, 1994) (reproducing decree).
10
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A district court agreed, and enjoined Microsoft from requiring
OEMs to purchase and install Internet Explorer. 11 In May of 1998,
the government filed a separate suit under the Sherman Act alleging that Microsoft's integration of Windows 98 with Internet
Explorer, as well as its contractual prohibition on OEMs interfering with access to the browser, constitute an illegal tying arrangement.12
On the surface, the government appears to have an easy case,
at least in the Sherman Act litigation. Microsoft seems to have
market power-a dominant share of the OS market, however
defined. 13 Moreover, there appears to be a "separate demand" for
OSs and browsers, with the result that the items are deemed distinct products. 14 Under current law, such an arrangement is unlawII
See Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. at 543-44. More precisely, the court
enjoined Microsoft from requiring OEMs to purchase and install IE 4.0,
which Microsoft shipped to OEMs on a separate disk. See note 5, supra.
The court did not, however, purport to require OEMs to remove any software code that had already been installed. See 980 F. Supp. at 544, n.8.
See also Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 940-41.

12
See Complaint in United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation, '1]'1]17-23 (May 18, 1998). The government, it should be noted,
pressed several other claims including, for instance, claims that various
contracts between Microsoft and Internet access providers violated § 1 of
the Sherman Act. This article focuses only on the tying claim.

The government has asserted that Microsoft possesses a monopoly
share of a market consisting of "operating systems for Intel-compatible
personal computers." See Memorandum of the United States in Support
of Motion for Preliminary Injunction in United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 15-18 (May 18, 1998); see also Declaration of David Sibley,
filed in support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, '11'117-8, 14 (supporting this definition and asserting that Microsoft possesses a 93% share
of the market so-defined). Moreover, the government has asserted that,
even if the market were defined more broadly, to include all PC operating
systems, Microsoft would still possess a monopoly share. See id. at '1114,
n.20.
13

See Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
19-22 ( 1984) (articulating "separate demand" test for determining
whether two items are separate products).
14
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ful per se, without further inquiry into its anticompetitive effects
or any offsetting benefits.JS
Still, just a few months ago, the D.C. Circuit suggested a quite
different result, namely, that such bundling is lawful, without
regard to the arrangement's possible anticompetitive effects.
Interpreting the 1994 consent decree, the court suggested that
Microsoft's bundles of Windows 95 and IE 3.0 and 4.0 did not
offend the decree but instead fell within its explicit exception for
"integrated products." 16 The combination of browser and OS, the
court said, appeared to produce benefits not available if, for
instance, Windows 95 were combined with Netscape's browser.J7
According to the court, judges are not competent to balance these
benefits against any anticompetitive effects that might result from
the combination, as such balancing would essentially require
courts to second-guess product design decisions. 18 A "plausible
claim" that integration of two items produced benefits, the court
said, would establish that Windows 95 and Internet Explorer were
not simply "bolted together" for the purpose of injuring competition, but were instead different functions of an innovative product
beneficial to consumers. 19 While the court remanded the case to
the district court for a determination whether the combination did,
in fact, produce such benefits, it signaled clearly its own belief
that such benefits were present.20
It did not matter to the D.C. Circuit that Microsoft distributed
IE 4.0 on a separate disk and that OEMs, therefore, could them1s See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451,
461-62 (1992); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9-18.
16

Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 945-53.

17

/d. at 950-51.

/d. at 950, n.l3 ("the limited competence of courts to evaluate
high-tech product designs and the high cost of error should make them
wary of second guessing the claimed benefits of a particular design decision").
18

•9

/d. at 949-51 and n.12.

/d. at 95 I, n. 15; id. at 952-53 (expressing "tentative" view that
Windows 95/IE bundle was a "genuine" integration).
20
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selves create the very same benefits by choosing to purchase and
combine the items. Software, the court said, was sufficiently
"plastic" that it could always be divided into constituent parts.
The mere feasibility of such division did not negate the showing
that combination produced benefits and thus could not transform
what was otherwise a single product into two.zi
In so holding, the court claimed that it was merely interpreting
the 1994 consent decree, and not determining whether the bundle
before it was an illegal tie under the Sherman Act. 22 Still, the
court asserted that its reading of the decree was "consistent with
tying law," and it invoked tying precedents and scholarly analysis
of tying doctrine to buttress its decision. 23 It was inevitable, then,
that the court's reasoning would "spill over" into the parallel litigation under the Sherman Act. Indeed, shortly after the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion, Microsoft moved for summary judgment in
the Sherman Act suit, relying heavily upon the D.C. Circuit's
opinion to argue that the Windows 98/IE bundle was a single
product for tying purposes. 24 While the district court denied the
motion, it grudgingly agreed with Microsoft that the D.C. Circuit's "plausible benefits" test supplied the appropriate standard
under the Sherman Act. zs

21

/d. at 951-52. See also notes 106-10, infra and accompanying

text.

Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950 n.14 ("The antitrust question is of
course distinct. The parties agree that the consent decree does not bar a
challenge under the Sherman Act.").
22

23

Id. at 950; see also id. at 949-53.

Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, at
20-22, 27-34.
24

Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,674-75 (concluding that question was whether there is a " 'plausible claim' that integration 'brings
some advantages.' "), quoting Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950; Microsoft,
1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,676-77 (finding factual dispute regarding
whether combination actually produced benefits and whether Microsoft
had simply "bolted" two items together).
25
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Ultimately, it seems the D.C. Circuit will have to decide
explicitly which standard-"separate demand" or "plausible benefits"-governs the question whether Windows 98 and Internet
Explorer constitute separate products for the purpose of tying
analysis. Moreover, the choice between these competing standards
will likely be outcome determinative. There is certainly a "separate demand" for browsers and operating systems: at least some of
Microsoft's competitors in the operating system market offer their
products in unbundled form. 26 Conversely, it seems Microsoft will
likely be able to demonstrate at least some plausible benefits produced by the Windows 98/IE bundle. Ironically, however, neither
outcome will rest upon any actual inquiry into the net competitive
effects of the arrangement. A determination that two products are
present will evoke the harsh rule of per se illegality; a holding
that the arrangement is an integrated or single product will end
the tying inquiry altogether.
The all or nothing character of each of these alternatives highlights tying law's propensity to treat efficiencies in an inconsistent
and irrational manner, a propensity exacerbated by the single
product test. A product of the applied price theory tradition of
industrial organization, the hornbook law of tying, including the
separate demand test for determining whether two items constitute
distinct products, is unduly biased against certain efficiencies.
More precisely, the separate demand test recognizes only those
efficiencies that are realized universally, i.e., by each firm participating in the relevant market. 27 Where the benefits of bundling
two items are not realized throughout the market, current law
treats such a bundle as a tie of two distinct products, a tie that is
unlawful per se if the seller possesses market power. 2s Benefits
that might be realized by only a subset of market participants will
be evaluated, if at all, pursuant to the unduly strict standards governing the "justification" of an otherwise per se unlawful tie.
26

See note 102, infra.

27
See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462-63; Jefferson Parish, 466
U.S. at 18-22.
2~

Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9-18.
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To many, the assertion that tying doctrine is biased will sound
like old news. After all, scholars have long argued that tying law
undervalues certain efficiency claims. 29 This article, however,
takes old news one step further. For, while tying doctrine undervalues certain efficiencies, particularly those generated posttransaction, it seems to overvalue others. For instance, where
efficiencies are realized universally, the separate demand test
declares the arrangement a single product, and therefore not a tie
at all. Thus, the test immunizes certain bundles without comparing their benefits to any anticompetitive harm they might create.
Moreover, some lower court precedents treat any innovative bundle that produces technological, cost-based efficiencies as a single
product, beyond antitrust scrutiny. Like the separate demand test,
this so-called technological tying doctrine immunizes certain
arrangements that may, on balance, reduce consumer welfare. This
immunity, it should be emphasized, applies only when the combination's benefits are technological in nature. Where, on the other
hand, the benefits are contractual, i.e., arise after the combination
leaves the boundaries of the firm, the bundle in question will be
deemed separate products and subject to the unforgiving standards
of the per se rule.
Current law thus deals with different sorts of efficiencies quite
differently, and there is no apparent justification for such disparate treatment. Against this backdrop, the D.C. Circuit's opinion can be seen as an attempt to impose a more consistent
approach to efficiencies, at least where innovative bundles are
concerned. By declaring beneficial bundles to be single products
even where a separate demand was present, the court followed the
lead of so-called technological tying doctrine, placing nonuniversal efficiencies on the same plane as those realized throughout the
market. Further, by recognizing benefits that arose after the soft29
See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REv. I
(1997); Benjamin Klein & Lester Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J. L. EcoN. 345 (1985); Tyler Baker, The
Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66
VA. L. REV. 1235, 1257-61 {1980).
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ware left Microsoft's boundaries, the court placed contractual
efficiencies on the same footing as those that are technological in
origin. In this way, the court carried the separate demand test
toward its logical conclusion, immunizing innovative bundles on
a finding that they produced significant benefits.
Certainly consistency has much to recommend it. Still, even if
implemented in the tying context, the D.C. Circuit's approach will
treat innovative bundles differently from others; the separate
demand test will, after all, still apply where noninnovative bundles are concerned. Moreover, a desire for a consistent approach
begs one fundamental question, i.e., which consistent approach?
The standard articulated by the D.C. Circuit was only one possibility. To be sure, such an approach may have merit as a matter of
second best, given the unduly harsh content of the per se rule.
Still, an optimal antitrust policy would account for the benefits of
such bundling the old fashioned way, by balancing them against
the anticompetitive effects, if any, produced by the arrangement.
While such an approach may seem foreclosed by the per se rule,
there is some precedent for balancing these effects by means of a
"business justification" defense to ties that are purportedly unlawful per se.
This is not to say that courts should engage in open-ended balancing whenever a seller can show that a bundle will produce benefits. Where a bundle is contractual, i.e., can be replicated by
purchasers, courts should demand some proof of market failure
before allowing a seller to show that a contractual restraint is justified. Where, on the other hand, a bundle is truly technological,
courts should engage in such balancing.

II. Tying law, efficiencies, and the rise of the
separate demand test
Under current law, an agreement will be deemed a per se
unlawful tie if three conditions are met: (1) the agreement bundles
two separate products; (2) the seller has market power over one of
the items included in the bundle; and (3) the bundle involves a not
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insubstantial amount of interstate commerce. 30 Where a firm holds
a monopoly, then, the inquiry very quickly devolves into one
question: Is the bundle really made up of separate products, or is
it instead just one product that, like nearly all products, consists of
several components? If deemed two products, the arrangement
will be declared unlawful per se, if one, beyond scrutiny under
tying doctrine. 31
Current law, then, prevents a monopolist from bundling two
truly separate products, even if the bundle produces no anticompetitive effects or is, on balance, procompetitive.32 That is, after
all, the plain implication of the per se rule. To be sure, some lower
courts allow sellers to justify bundles, even if per se unlawfuJ.33
Other courts, however, have decided that "per se" means what it
says, and the Supreme Court has never endorsed the assertion of an
affirmative defense to a tie otherwise deemed per se unlawful.3 4
At any rate, even those courts that purportedly allow sellers to
justify ties usually subject such attempts at justification to the
strictest of scrutiny. Sellers must show that benefits outweigh any
anticompetitive effects, and that the bundle is the least restrictive
30
See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461-62; Jefferson Parish, 466
U.S. at 9-18.
31

Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 20-22.

32
See id., at 33-35 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (criticizing the per se
rule against tying on this basis).

33
See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d
1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987) (entertaining business justification
defense).
34
See, e.g., Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs., Inc., 806 F.2d 953,
957-58 (lOth Cir. 1986) (affirmative defenses are not available where tie
is per se unlawful); Ringtown Wilbert Vault Works v. Schuylkill Mem'l
Park, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 823, 827 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (same); Jefferson
Parish, 466 U.S. at 25-26, n.42 ("We have also uniformly rejected . . .
'goodwiii' defenses for tying arrangements . . . [and] there is no basis
for departing from our prior cases here."); Meese, supra note 29, at 21,
n.74 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent precludes the assertion of
affirmative defense to "per se" illegal ties).
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means of achieving any legitimate objectives.3s It is on this second requirement that most attempts at justification founder, as
courts are quick to invoke "less restrictive" alternatives that are
also significantly less effective at meeting the objective in question.36 For instance, a franchisor that requires its franchisees to
purchase inputs from it as a means of maintaining uniform, high
quality in the franchise product will be met with the claim that
quality specifications, or even reliance on franchisees' best judgment, will suffice for this purpose.37 In so doing, courts ignore the
very rationale of such restrictions, namely, that franchisees may
lack the requisite information or incentive to choose inputs of sufficient quality, and that specifications are costly to create, monitor
and enforce.3s Similar undue hostility has always met assertions
that bundling is necessary to protect the goodwill of a main or
tying product. 39
35
Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz A. G., 828 F.2d 1033,
1040-41 (4th Cir. 1987); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43,
50-52 (9th Cir. 1971); cf. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474-75.

36

See generally Meese, supra note 29, at 71-86.

37
See Metrix Warehouse, Inc., 828 F.2d at 1041 (franchisor could
protect its goodwill by relying upon specifications or franchisees' judgment); Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 51-52 (franchisor could protect its
goodwill by relying upon specifications); Anderson Foreign Motors v.
New England Toyota, 475 F. Supp. 973, 984-85 (D. Mass. 1979). But
compare Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1349-51 (affirming jury's finding that
less restrictive alternatives would not adequately advance franchisor's
interest in protecting goodwill associated with trademark).

3S
See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean
World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REv. Ill,
117-22, 149-51 (1996).
3Y
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-84 (asserting that
Kodak could protect its goodwill by relying on purchasers' judgment);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) (dicta)
(asserting that seller can protect goodwill of tying product without contractual restraint by relying upon purchasers to choose superior tied product); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947)
(concluding that manufacturer could protect its goodwill by relying upon
specifications); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936)
(holding that manufacturer could protect its goodwill by relying upon
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Tying doctrine's hostility toward affirmative defenses insures
that cases of monopoly bundling will almost always stand or fall
on the answer to the separate product question. As a result, tying
law, at least as articulated by the Supreme Court, has for some
time been overinclusive, voiding any tie of separate products
obtained by a monopolist, even those ties that were competitively
neutral or even beneficial. 40 Many lower courts, however, tempered the overinclusive character of formal doctrine through
manipulation of the single product test, folding into the test the
question whether the bundle in question created significant efficiencies.41 In so doing, courts treated as single products packages
of items that, as a matter of common sense anyway, looked quite
distinct. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp. provides a
prime example of this approach. There, a seller of mechanical
customers' judgment or, in the alternative, promulgating specifications);
Judson L. Thompson Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952, 957-58 (1st Cir. 1945)
(same). See also Meese, supra note 29, at 72-84.

See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 33-35 (O'Connor, J. concurring)
(criticizing tying doctrine on this basis).
40

See, e.g., Hirsch v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343,
1347-48 (9th Cir. 1982) (determining whether two items were separate
products by asking "whether the aggregation serves to facilitate competition by promoting product quality"); Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631
F.2d 303, 307-11 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that franchise opportunity and
lease of franchise premises were a single product because "the challenged
aggregation is an essential ingredient for the franchise system's formula
for success"); Kugler v. Aamco Automatic Transmission, 460 F.2d 1214,
1215-16 (8th Cir. 1972); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
292 F.2d 653, 655-57 (1st Cir. 1961). See also HERBERT HovENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE,
366 (1994) ("(C]reative courts have manipulated the judicial test so as to
distinguish efficient from inefficient forced sales."); STEPHEN F. Ross,
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW, 290 (1992). Several scholars endorsed such
an approach. Klein & Saft, supra note 29, at 359-61; Baker, supra note
29, at 1315 (endorsing broad single product inquiry as second-best
approach given overinclusive nature of the per se rule); Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 29
(1957). See also LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 448-49 (1977) (arguing that most efficiency claims can be addressed as part of the single
product inquiry).
41
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unloaders bundled such unloaders with storage silos. The seller
claimed that, when it had previously sold unloaders separately, for
use with silos made by others, it received substantial customer
complaints. 42 First Circuit precedent, however, foreclosed any
assertion that such concerns justified an otherwise illegal tie.
Evaluating a tie of rivet-setting machines and rivets, the court had
previously held that purchasers, "are quite capable of judging for
themselves in an atmosphere of competition whether or not rivets
of one manufacturer will work in the machines of another," with
the result that any justification must fail. 4 3 Nevertheless, the
Dehydrating Process court relied on the (negative) goodwill consequences of separate sale in holding that unloaders and silos
were a single product.44 Under this and similar precedents, then, a
bundle that created significant benefits was, without more, a "single product," beyond antitrust scrutiny.4s
Indeed, one half of these purchasers filed refund claims. Dehydrating Process Co., 292 F.2d at 655-56. Such complaints occurred, the
court noted, despite the seller's efforts to inform purchasers that its
unloaders might not be compatible with silos made by others. See id. at
656.
42

See Judson L. Thompson Mfg. Co., 150 F.2d at 957-58 (condemning tie of rivet-setting machines and rivets). See also note 39, supra (collecting Supreme Court authority for the same proposition). The court
reached this conclusion, it should be noted, despite its finding that "the
best results are obtained when the machines and rivets of one manufacturer are used together, and that if improper rivets are used repairs to the
machines at the expense of the lessor and interruptions might ensure."
Judson L. Thompson Mfg. Co., 150 F.2d at 957.
43

Dehydrating Process Co., 292 F.2d at 655-57.
45

For instance, in Principe, the Fourth Circuit found that McDonald's requirement that franchisees lease premises from it was not a tie
because the trademark and premises were "integral components of the
business methods being franchised." 631 F.2d at 309. In so holding, the
court emphasized that McDonald's possessed superior information about
local real estate markets and was in a better position to take account of
the effect of certain locations on the franchise system as a whole. See
Principe, 631 F.2d at 309-10; see also Kugler, 460 F.2d at 1215-16
(holding that franchise trademark and advertising materials purchased
from a local agency were not separate products for tying purposes). Cf
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The Supreme Court put a stop to this creativity, or at least
tried to, in Jefferson Parish. There the Court rejected the assertion
that the answer to the single product question should turn on
whether the bundle in question produces significant benefits.4 6
Instead, the Court said, two items should be deemed separate
products whenever there is sufficient "separate demand" for each
of the bundled items that a significant number of firms do, in fact,
offer the items in question separately. 47 The existence of such separate sales, the Court said, would establish that it is efficient to
offer the items in unbundled form. 48 Lower courts, in turn, relied
on this new test to find two products where previous tests may
have found only one. 49
Leading antitrust scholars have endorsed the Jefferson Parish
approach to the single product question, characterizing this standard as a process-oriented mechanism for determining whether, in
Meese, supra note 38, at 132-33 (arguing that, as the sole owner of the
trademark, the franchisor will have incentive to maximize revenue of the
franchise system).

Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-20. Cf. id. at 40 (O'Connor, J.
concurring) (arguing that two items should not be deemed separate products "when the economic advantages of joint packaging are substantial");
see also Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698,
703-04 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that Jefferson Parish rejected
"economies" test for determining whether bundle of two items constituted a single product).
46

47
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22; see also Eastman Kodak, 504
U.S. at 462-63 (applying separate demand test).

48
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 22-23; see also Eastman Kodak, 504
U.S. at 462-63 ("[T]he development of the entire high tech service industry is evidence of the efficiency of a separate market for service.").
49
Compare Faulkner Advertising Associates, Inc. v. Nissan Motor
Corp., 905 F.2d 769, 773-74 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that franchise
trademark and advertising services were distinct products under Jefferson
Parish separate demand test) with Principe, 631 F.2d at 309-10 (trademark and real estate lease are single product) and Kugler, 460 F.2d at
1215-16 (trademark and advertising services are a single product). See
also PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 814-16
(6th Cir. 1997) (finding circuit boards and constituent components to be
single product).
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fact, the bundling at issue produces significant efficiencies.so Of
course, the fact that a seller with market power has chosen to bundle two items is little indication of the practice's efficiency. However, even in those instances in which a firm has a monopoly for
antitrust purposes, there may be a significant number of other
firms in the market that have no market power. 51 Moreover, even
if a firm possesses a complete monopoly within its own geographic market, there may be other geographic markets that are
quite competitive.52 Where firms with no market power or expectation of obtaining it commonly sell the items in question separately, it is said, a presumption is properly established that
unbundled sale of the items is efficient, and further scrutiny is
necessary. 53 Where, on the other hand, all such firms provide the
items in question only in a bundle, combination must reflect cost
savings when compared to separate provision. 54 In such cases, it is
said tying analysis should cease, as forcing even a monopolist to
unbundle would be inefficient.ss Indeed, condemnation of a uniso See X PHILLIP E. AREEDA, EINER ELHAUGE & HERBERT HovENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW 11111741, 1744, at 196-202, 1745b, c (1995); see also
Ross, supra note 41, at 287-90.
51
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481 (80% share of market
sufficient to show monopoly); American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 797 (1944) (market share greater than two-thirds constitutes a monopoly).

sz

See AREEDA

ET

AL., supra note 50, 111744cl.

S3
See id. 111744, at 203-04; see also Ross, supra note 41, at 289
(agreeing with statement in Eastman Kodak that existence of separate
sales for tied product "is evidence of the efficiencies of a separate market'').
54

See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 111744, at 197-98. See also
HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 360 (arguing that ubiquity of a tying
arrangement does not establish market power because "if the arrangement
is efficient, then we would expect it to be ubiquitous"). Cf Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221-22 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Bork, J.) (where contract cannot create or enhance market power,
it likely is designed "to make the conduct of business more effective").
ss

See AREEDA

ET

AL., supra note 50, 111744b, c5.
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versally-adopted bundle would purportedly place a monopolist at
an unfair competitive disadvantage. 56
In the real world, of course, the separate demand test for determining whether two items are distinct products will not identify
every instance in which bundling produces significant efficiencies. While the presence of uniform bundling in a competitive
market is sufficient to demonstrate that bundling produces significant benefits, it is by no means necessary. Instead, bundling may
substantially reduce the costs faced by some firms but not those
faced by others; in such cases the separate demand test will nevertheless compel the conclusion that two products are involved.57
Still, scholars maintain courts can properly account for such
nonuniversal efficiencies by allowing sellers to assert a business
justification defense.ss

III. Tying doctrine, price theory, and the treatment of
innovative bundles
A

Tying doctrine as applied price theory

As currently structured tying law takes cognizance of efficiencies in two very different ways. Some benefits are captured by the
separate demand test with its reliance upon the presence or
absence of bundling by firms with no market power or chance of
achieving it. When application of this test reveals that benefits are
present, the bundle in question is treated as a single product, and
scrutiny ends. Benefits not captured by this test, if they are recognized at all, will only be considered under the hostile standards
governing the scrutiny of business justifications.
56
57

50,~

Id.

See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-23; AREEDA ET AL., supra note
1744e, at 204. See also notes, 73-84, infra and accompanying text.

58
AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50,~ 1741b, at 180-81; id.
I744e, at 204. See also Ross, supra note 41, at 290, 296-99 (assuming
that, where separate demand is present, efficiencies can be properly analyzed via a business justification defense); HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at
369-70 (same).

~
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Tying law's uneven approach to different sorts of efficiencies
is not, it seems, accidental. Instead, this disparate treatment
reflects what Oliver Williamson has described as the "applied
price theory" tradition of industrial organization, a tradition that
has influenced antitrust doctrine for several decades. 59 Price theory, and the school of industrial organization that it spawned, provided a complete paradigm that purported to explain all varieties
of firm behavior. The assumptions animating the paradigm were
straightforward. The world consisted of innumerable, fully
autonomous firms. The boundary between a firm and the market-that is, the distinction between what a firm did itself and
what it left for others-was a function of the firm's own costs and
those of potential suppliers or distributors. These costs, in tum,
were determined entirely by technology and reflected in each
firm's production function.60 So, for instance, in deciding whether
to produce its own auto bodies or purchase auto bodies from others, an automobile manufacturer would compare its own cost of
production with those of potential suppliers; differences in such
costs would be a function of economies of scale, economies of
scope, and the like. 61
S9
See Oliver Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust. 76 GEo. L. J. 271,
273 (1987) (describing influence of applied price theory tradition of
antitrust); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
23-26, 365-84 (1985) (same); R. H. CoASE, Industrial Organization: A
Proposal for Research, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 57, 58-62
(1988) (describing limitations of price-theoretic approach to industrial
organization). See also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical
Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 190-92
(1997) (describing price-theoretic assumptions underlying traditional
doctrines governing vertical restraints).

w
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 7-8, 86-89; Oliver Williamson,
Technology and Transaction Cost Economics, 10 J. EcoN. BEH. & 0RG.
355, 356 (1988) (contending that, within price-theoretic paradigm, "the

'natural' boundaries of the firm were thought to be defined by engineering considerations"); George Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited By
the Extent of the Market, 59 J. PoL EcoN. 185, 185 (1951) (economists
"have generally treated as a (technological?) datum the problem of what
the firm does-what governs its range of activities or functions").
61
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 3. Thus, works of the period
referred to two-and only two-possible justifications for vertical inte-
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Because the costs of performing any given economic activity
were solely a function of production technology, the price-theoretic paradigm only recognized or contemplated efficiencies of the
sort that could be realized within a firm, previous to any sale
transaction. Concomitantly, within this paradigm, once a sale was
made, and the item in question passed beyond the boundary of the
firm, any efficiencies attributable to that firm were exhausted.
Thus, there was nothing to be gained through contractual restrictions on the manner in which a purchaser used the item sold or
performed any functions related to it.62 To be sure, a firm could
realize (technological) efficiencies by integrating fully into
another step of the production process; it could not, however, realize similar efficiencies by contract. 63
gration: (1) reduction in production costs and (2) monopolization or other
antisocial behavior. See, e.g., DoNALD DEWEY, MoNOPOLY IN EcoNOMICS
AND LAw 201-02 (1959); Friedrich Kessler & Richard Stern, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1959);
Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, 22 U. CHI. L.
REv. 157, 200 (1954). See also Williamson, supra note 60, at 356 (contending that, aside from engineering considerations, "[o]nly a narrow
range of price theoretic purposes for reshaping economic organization are
entertained by this conception of the firm . . . to perfect monopoly,
evade sales taxes and the like").

See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 371 (concluding that, within
price-theoretic paradigm, "there was nothing to be gained by introducing
nonstandard [contractual] terms into market-mediated exchange"); id. at
23-26; CoASE, supra note 59, at 67. A prime example is found in price
theory's treatment of exclusive dealing contracts. As described by price
theorists, the benefits of such arrangements were limited to their propensity to lower the costs of production and distribution. Such arrangements,
for instance, were thought to assure manufacturers of an outlet for their
product and insure larger and less frequent deliveries. Because these benefits could be reflected in volume discounts, scholars said dealers would
choose exclusive purchasing "voluntarily," without contractual requirement. See, e.g., JoEL B. DIRLAM & ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR CoMPETITION:
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST PoLICY 181-87 (1954) ("(l)t is difficult to see why many of the mutual benefits and socially beneficent
consequences of exclusive dealing require coercion for their achievement."); accord, Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 313-14.
62

63
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 184-89. Professor Williamson
cites the brief of the United States in United States v. Arnold Schwinn,
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Price theory's embrace of a technology-only view of efficiencies, it should be noted, depended upon certain critical assumptions about the behavior of those who took title to items once they
passed beyond the seller's boundaries. For instance, it was
assumed that purchasers had perfect information about items they
bought, or that sellers could provide them with such information
costlessly.64 Moreover, it was assumed that purchasers would not
act opportunistically, that is, would behave so as to maximize the
joint utility of both parties.6s Given these assumptions, price theorists saw no legitimate need for contractual restraints on the manner in which purchasers made use of the product.66
388 U.S. 365 (1967), a brief authored by Donald Turner and Richard Posner. Similar reasoning can be found in WilliamS. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1436 (1968).
64
See Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs,
and the Passage of Time, in CoASEAN EcoNOMics: LAw AND EcoNOMICS
AND THE NEw INSTITUTIONAL EcoNOMICS 2 (Steven G. Medema ed., 1998)
("In this kingdom [the price-theoretic paradigm], knowledge remains
explicitly and freely transmittable, and cognitive limits seldom if ever
constrain.").
65
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 7 (noting that price-theoretic
paradigm assumed that adjudication would prevent opportunism); id. at
48 (arguing that, in the absence of opportunism, parties could govern
relationships through "general clause" contracting, requiring each to act
in a jointly-rational manner); Comanor, supra note 63, at 1430 (asserting
that "unrestricted market" would provide optimal quantity of pre- and
postsale services, despite free-rider problem); id at 1433 (same); Lee E.
Preston, Restricted Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and
Public Policy Factors, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 506, 511 n.12 (1965).
Meese, supra note 59, at 190-92 (asserting that traditional approach to
vertical restraints rested on such an assumption).

66

Professor Williamson has summarized this milieu as follows:
The allocation of economic activity as between firms and markets
was taken as a datum; firms were characterized as production
functions; markets served as signaling devices; contracting was
accomplished through an auctioneer; and disputes were disregarded because of the presumed efficacy of court adjudication.
The possibility that subtle economizing purposes are served by
organizational variety does not arise within-indeed, is effectively
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The fact that price theory recognized only technological, pretransactional efficiencies did not insure that it recognized all such
efficiencies. The paradigm did more than assume that technology
was the sole source of efficiencies; it also assumed that all firms
possessed the same technology and thus faced the same production function. 67 This singular focus on (universally possessed)
beyond the reach of-this orthodox frame work. Correspondingly,
the prevailing public policy attitude toward unfamiliar or nonstandard business practices during that interval was deep suspicion
and even hostility.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 7.
Professor Coase offered a similar summary of the price-theoretic attitude toward contractual restraints.
[I]f an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort
or other-that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly
explanation. And as we are very ignorant in this field, the number
of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the
reliance on a monopoly explanation is frequent.
CoASE, supra note 59, at 67.
67
Langlois, supra note 64, at 2-4 ("[T]he 'theory of the firm' of
price theory . . . begins with identical idealized firms and then builds up
to the industry by simple addition. . . . Thus does the 'theory of the
firm' in the modern-day price theory start with firms as production functions, each one identical, and each one transforming homogeneous inputs
into homogeneous outputs according to given technical 'blueprints'
known to all."). See also F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society,
35 AMER. EcoN. REv. 519, 521-22 (1945) (decrying overreliance by
economists and others upon "scientific knowledge," to the exclusion of
more localized, idiosyncratic knowledge). The assumption that firms all
possess the same production function, of course, was most often associated explicitly with the perfect competition model. As Professor Hayek
observed, however, most conditions of the perfect competition model
"are equally assumed in the discussion of the various 'imperfect' or
'monopolistic' markets, which throughout assume certain unrealistic
'perfections.'" See F. A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 94 (1948). See also id. at 97-98 (describing
assumption of perfect competition model that "a large number of people
are producing the same commodity and command the same objective
facilities and opportunities for doing so"); Langlois, supra note 64, at 2
(noting that Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlin, who pioneered the
theory of oligopoly, relied upon price-theoretic models).
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technology as the sole source of efficiencies precluded recognition of efficiencies associated with differences in institutional
structure, personal knowledge, and the Iike.6s In the real world, of
course, such differences as well as, for that matter, historical accident, could lead different firms to adopt different technologies, or
to employ similar technologies in varying ways. 69 By ignoring
these differences in knowledge, structure and history, and thus
assuming that all firms employed the same technology and faced
the same costs, price theory missed important sources of pretransactional efficiency.
The law of tying, and with it the current test for distinguishing
a bundle from a single product, reflect the price-theoretic
paradigm. As I have shown elsewhere, the law's attitude toward
tying distinct products flows readily from price theory's hostility
toward contracts apparently designed to extend a firm's influence
beyond its "natural" boundaries. 70 This hostility has found expresSee Williamson, supra note 59, at 11-12; Langlois, supra note 64,
at 2-4. See also HAYEK, supra note 67, at 97-99.
6S

69
See, e.g., Langlois, supra note 64, at II ("Standard price theory
partakes of the epistemology of old spy movies, in which complete
knowledge of how to build and launch an ICBM could somehow be transcribed onto a microdot and hidden under a postage stamp. . . . In the
world of tacit knowledge, [however,] having the same blueprints as one's
competitors is unlikely to translate into having the same costs of production."); HAYEK, supra note 67, at IOI-02 ("[I]n conditions of real life the
position even of any two producers is hardly ever the same. . . . At any
given moment the equipment of a particular firm is always largely determined by historical accident, and the problem is that it should make the
best use of the given equipment (including the acquired capacities of the
members of its staff) and not what it should do if it were given infinite
time to adjust itself to constant conditions."); HAYEK, supra note 67, at
523 ("How easy is it for an inefficient manager to dissipate the differentials on which profitability rests and that it is possible, with the same
technical facilities, to produce with a great variety of costs are among
commonplaces of business experience that do not seem to be equally
familiar in the study of the economist.").
70
Meese, supra note 29. at 50-54. Cf Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at
21-22 (stating that the single product test must be framed so as to identify those instances in which sellers "have foreclosed competition on the
merits in a product market distinct from the market for the tying item").
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sion not merely in the ease with which the per se rule is invoked,
but also, of course, in the poor treatment accorded attempts at
business justifications. Witness, for instance, the many statements
by economists and others that purchasers are perfectly capable of
deciding for themselves whether to purchase the items a seller
wishes to bundle, even in those instances in which a seller can
demonstrate that such bundling will protect its goodwill. 71 This
assumption of course, is reflected in tying law's conclusion that
reliance upon the purchaser's judgment, perhaps informed by
specifications, is an effective, less restrictive alternative that
defeats the assertion of a business justification defense. 72
Of course, there is nothing to justify unless the law treats the
bundled items as separate products. Like tying law generally,
however, the separate demand test rests upon unrealistic assumptions associated with the price-theoretic paradigm. As noted earlier, this test treats separate sale of two items as efficient whenever
some firms in the relevant market engage in such unbundling. 73
The necessary implication of such a finding, of course, is that the
bundling before the court is not designed to minimize costs. This
See, e.g., James M. Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 522, 558-64 (1965);
Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the
Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50, 66-67 (1958); Alfred E. Kahn, A
Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman and Clayton Acts,
63 YALE L.J. 293, 324, n.160 (1954); William B. Lockhart & Howard R.
Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether
Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV.
L. REv. 913, 946 (1952); Louis B. Schwartz, Potential Impairment of
Competition-The Impact of Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States,
98 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 27 (1949) ("The efficiency of uniting two products
in use [should] be judged by the end user.").
71

72
See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-84; Standard Oil, 337 U.S.
at 305; International Salt, 332 U.S. at 397-98; IBM, 298 U.S. at 139;
Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1041; Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at
51-52; Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co., 150 F.2d at 957-58. See also
Times-Picayune Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) ("[A]ny
intrinsic superiority of the 'tied' product would convince freely choosing
buyers to select it over others, anyway.").
73

See notes 46-49, supra and accompanying text.
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result, however, depends upon the (price-theoretic) assumption
that all firms in the relevant market, including the monopolist,
share the same production function and thus the same costs as
those firms that have chosen to unbundle.7 4 Otherwise, there
would be no basis for presuming that separate sale by the monopolist would be efficient. Efficiencies not realized by all, then, are
barely recognized.
Posttransactional efficiencies, it seems, find themselves particularly hard hit by the separate demand approach. For, unlike pretransactional efficiencies, which may in some cases correspond to
uniform technological laws, posttransactional efficiencies will
likely be correlated with nonuniform, idiosyncratic factors.7s
A fast food franchisor, for instance, may find itself with two
classes of franchisee: those who do business in stable neighborhoods with a significant amount of repeat business, and those who
do business on turnpikes with mostly one-time patrons. In these
circumstances, a franchisor might logically decide to protect the
goodwill associated with its trademark by requiring the second
class of franchisee to purchase certain inputs only from the franchisor, leaving those franchisees in the first class free to choose
inputs of their choice.76 Or, a particular franchisor may confine its
74
Indeed, a leading treatise explicitly assumes that universal
bundling in one competitive market should establish that bundles in other
markets are efficient because production costs and quality concerns will
likely be uniform across geographic markets. See AREEDA ET AL., supra
note 50, 1]1744cl, at 198-99. See also id. 1]1744c4, at 200 ("That the
unconcentrated competitors bundle A-B in the very same market as the
defendant makes it unlikely that the cost, quality, or consumer preference
implications of the bundling differ among the sellers."). The treatise
offers no theoretical argument or empirical evidence for these assertions
that firms that make the same products generally share the same production functions.

1s

See

WILLIAMSON,

supra note 59, at 48.

76
See Meese, supra note 38, at 119, n.37; WILLIAMSON, supra note
59, at 48 ("It is not necessary, moreover, that all parties be given to
opportunism in identical degree. . . . [I]f the propensity to behave
opportunistically is known to vary among members of the contracting
population, . . . gains can be realized by expending resources to discriminate among types."). Indeed, some franchisors have gone so far as to
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locations to areas where repeat business predominates, and thus
eschew bundling, while a different franchisor that focuses only on
turnpikes or similar areas with little repeat business might adopt
bundling throughout its entire system.n
Each such instance of franchisor bundling could produce substantial benefits; yet, each will be deemed a tie of separate products under current law. For, under that law, a trademark and good
or service will only be deemed a single product where the franchise is of a source variety, that is, where the trademark in question simply signals that the bundled item was necessarily
manufactured within the same firm that owns the trademark. 78 If,
on the other hand, the franchise is of a business format variety,
the trademark will merely signify that the franchisee is operating
under the franchisor's guidelines, and not that the franchise product originates with the franchisor. Many other firms will likely
manufacture the bundled item, and the separate demand test will
require the conclusion that the bundle consists of two distinct
products.79 Items that technology requires to be produced within
integrate vertically with respect to those outlets that serve mostly onetime customers, leaving other outlets independently owned. See Keith K.
Wollenberg, Note, An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Reexamining
the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REv. 737, 754-55, n.114 (1987) (noting
that Standard Oil once owned all service stations operating on interstate
highways, while allowing owner-operated stations in neighborhoods
where repeat trade was prevalent).
77
See Klein & Saft, supra note 29, at 348, n.15 (noting that a particular franchisor "assured high-quality supply by granting franchisees
fairly large exclusive territories and locating their outlets off the main
highway").
78
See Power Test Petroleum Distributors v. Calcu Gas, 754 F.2d 91,
96-98 (2d Cir. 1985); Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 704-05; Krehl v.
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).

See, e.g., Faulkner Advertising Associates, 905 F.2d at 772-74;
Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 51-52; William Cohen & Son v. All American Hero, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 201, 205-07 (D. N.J. 1988); Smith v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Mo. 1987). The leading academic
proponent of the separate demand test, it should be noted, has rejected
any distinction between source and business format franchises, arguing
that, in either case, courts should deem a bundle that produces significant
79
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the firm owning the trademark will be deemed part of a single
product, those naturally produced outside the firm will be deemed
distinct. 80 As two scholars have noted, this result is perverse, as
bundling may well produce more benefits where a business format
franchise is involved.SI
To some extent, the current bias against efficiencies not
acknowledged by the price-theoretic paradigm could be remedied
by explicitly recognizing the availability of affirmative defenses
and relaxing the traditionally onerous standards governing their
assertion. And, indeed, several scholars, including some who support the current contours of the single product test, have called for
just such an approach.8 2 More precisely, these scholars have called
efficiencies a single product. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, '1!1749a2.
Thus, the treatise approves of the result in Principe, although many franchisors do not, as McDonald's did there, require their franchisees to lease
real estate from them. See id. 'IJ1749a2, at 256, n.25 (approving Principe).
The treatise implicitly concedes, then, that the separate demand test does
not identify all bundles that produce significant benefits.
so Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 48, n.4 (concluding that Chicken
Delight trademark and bundled items were separate products because,
inter alia, "Chicken Delight did not itself manufacture the tied items").
Similarly, the manufacturer of a complex machine may believe that some
purchasers have the correct incentives and expertise to choose their own
complementary products, but that others are incapable of making such
choices. See IBM, 298 U.S. at 134 (noting that IBM, which bundled the
purchase of adding machines and punch cards, allowed the United States
to purchase cards separately, upon payment of a royalty). If, however, the
manufacturer should choose to bundle only with respect to the second
class of customers, the separate demand test will compel a finding that
the seller has tied two separate products. PSI Corp., 104 F.3d at 816-17
(describing Honeywell's practice of bundling with respect to some customers but not others and concluding that two products were present);
Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM, 33 F.3d 194, 214 (3d Cir. 1994) (same). Cf.
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 484 (questioning Kodak's claim that
bundling was necessary to protect its goodwill because the policy was not
pursued consistently).
~1

Klein & Saft, supra note 29, at 359-61.

': See, e.g., AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, '1!1760e-f; HovENKAMP,
supra note 41, at 369; Ross, supra note 41, at 296-300. See also Meese,
supra note 38, at 141-45, 149-52 (taking contours of separate product
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on courts to treat efficiencies not identified by the separate
demand test just as courts would treat such efficiencies in the rule
of reason context.s 3 Indeed, as noted earlier, one treatise has
explicitly argued that the availability of such relaxed scrutiny justifies the refusal to consider nonuniversal efficiencies at the single
product stage.84
Certainly relaxation of the current judicial hostility toward the
assertion of justifications to bundles would be a positive development; indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the prevalence of such
efficiencies requires repeal of the per se rule. 85 Still, such relaxation would not eliminate entirely the disparate treatment currently accorded different sorts of efficiencies. Instead, under such
a regime, any efficiencies captured by the separate demand test
would, ipso facto, immunize the bundle from further scrutiny.
Other efficiencies, however, would have to be weighed against
any anticompetitive effects produced by the bundle. Moreover,
even if such efficiencies were to predominate, the bundle would
nevertheless be condemned if the same (or nearly the same) benefits could be achieved through less restrictive means. 86
test as a given and advocating relaxation of standards governing affirmative defenses).
83
See Meese, supra note 82, at 141-45, 149-52; AREEDA ET AL.,
supra note 50, 1]1760e-f; HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 369; Ross, supra
note 41, at 296-300.

84
See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1741b, at 180-81. See also
Ross, supra note 41, at 290.
85

See Meese, supra note 29, at 86-94.

86
See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1760d ("Even where the benefit of the restraint outweighs the harm, society need not suffer that harm
if the defendant's legitimate objectives can be achieved equally well (or
nearly so) by an alternative means that restrains competition substantially
less."); see also VII AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1505, at 385-89
(describing identical approach in the rule of reason context). This treatise
recognizes that rule of reason scrutiny would treat efficiencies less favorably than does the single product test it praises and advocates. See
AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1760c, at 366. On the next page, however, it asserts that "a tribunal's relative hospitality to efficiency and
other defenses should be the same whether lack of justification is consid-
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The rationale for such disparate treatment is not immediately
apparent. According to some, where bundling two items is a universal practice, forcing a monopolist to unbundle will be inefficient, i.e., will force the firm to employ more real resources than
necessary to provide the ultimate good or service in question.s 7
Moreover, because firms with no market power will remain free to
bundle, forced unbundling will place the monopolist at a competitive disadvantage.ss Each of these arguments, however, depends
upon the assumption that all firms, including the monopolist,
share the same production function, i.e., that the monopolist realizes the same efficiencies through bundling as do smaller firms.
If, on the other hand, bundling does not produce the same efficiencies for the monopolist, prohibiting such bundling will have
no negative effects.
Let us assume, however, that the presence of universal
bundling establishes that firms share the same production function. Even if this is the case, there is still no reason to distinguish
universal efficiencies from those that are achieved only by certain
firms, such as the monopolist. For, even in the case of nonuniversal efficiencies, forcing the monopolist to unbundle will be inefficient, raise the firm's costs and place it at a disadvantage vis a vis
those firms still allowed to bundle, or firms that can replicate its
costs without bundling. Relaxation of the price-theoretic assumption that all firms share the same production function, and the
concomitant recognition that bundling can benefit some but not
others, calls into question any preference for bundles that are universally adopted. Consistency would seem to require adjustments
in tying doctrine designed to take cognizance of efficiencies in a
more rational manner.

ered under the one product or the defensive heading." !d. 1!1760c, at 367.
Both statements, it seems, cannot be correct.
87

See note 55, supra and accompanying text.
See note 56, supra and accompanying text.
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B. Special treatment for innovations

The shortcomings of the separate demand test are most apparent in rapidly changing markets, where firms are least likely to
share similar cost structures. Thus, even scholars who otherwise
support the Jefferson Parish separate demand test have advocated
a more relaxed approach where the bundle in question can be
characterized as an innovation. As defined by these scholars,
"innovation" can take two forms. First, a firm may cause previously separate items to work together in a new manner.s9 Or, a
firm may begin bundling items that had, in the past, been combined downstream by purchasers.9° In either case, a straightforward application of the Jefferson Parish test would seem to
mandate a finding that the bundled items are separate products.
By hypothesis, after all, the items have always been sold separately; moreover, other firms may not rapidly mimic the innovation.91 Thus, it would seem, there will be a separate demand for
bundled items and tying analysis must proceed.
Despite the apparent result under the price-theoretic separate
demand test, scholars have argued that courts should allow sellers
to demonstrate directly that, in fact, an innovative combination
actually lowers the costs of production or creates an improved
product, and that consumers are not able to replicate these benefits by combining the separate items themselves. 92 If the innovative bundle does create such benefits, there is only one product,
and scrutiny should end.93 If not, then tying analysis should go
forward and any claim that the bundle produces net benefits
should be evaluated as an affirmative defense. And, indeed, some
89

AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, '!11746, at 224-25.

9o

!d. at 225-26.

91
See id. at 224 ("By definition, new products are product bundles
that others have not significantly marketed. Thus, they cannot be found a
single product under the [separate demand] test.").
92

See id. at 224-29; HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 368-69.

93
See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, '!11746, at 224-29; HOVENKAMP,
supra note 41, at 368-69. See also Jack Walters, Inc., 737 F.2d at 703.
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lower courts have employed just such a test, albeit before Jefferson Parish announced the separate demand standard. 94
Of course, any test that allows sellers of innovative bundles to
demonstrate directly the benefits of such arrangements will take
cognizance of a broader range of efficiencies than can be captured
under the separate demand test. In particular, such a test will capture-and treat as dispositive-efficiencies that a particular firm
might realize ahead of or to the exclusion of others. Thus, the test
will eliminate some of the disparate treatment produced by price
theory's assumption that market participants generally face the
same production function.9 5 Still, such an approach is not entirely
divorced from price theory; for, like the separate demand test, the
test will not identify posttransactional benefits. Instead, courts
and scholars have limited their definition of cost savings to those
realized through so-called technological tying, that is, efficiencies
that a firm can generate by technologically uniting two or more
items. 96 Savings realized by uniting items contractually-that is,
~4
See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537
F.2d 1307, 1330-31 (5th Cir. 1976) (declaring operating system and
computer hardware a single product because "technological factor tying
the hardware to the software" was designed "to achieve [a] technologically beneficial result") (alternate holding); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F.
Supp. 258, 347 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894
(10th Cir. 1975); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 448 F.
Supp. 228, 230-32 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (finding combination of PC drive
unit and head/disk assembly a single product because, inter alia, combination eliminated need for an automatic loading mechanism and thus
lowered the cost per megabyte of storage capacity); but compare id. at
232-33 (relying also upon fact that combination was consistent with
industry practice). See also Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 703 F.2d 534, 541-43 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that Kodak's release
of new film that could only be developed using Kodak chemicals and
paper was not a "tie" because no coercion was present).
~s
Cf. notes 67-68, supra and accompanying text (describing price
theory's assumption that firms generally possess the same production
function).
46

See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1746, at 225-27; HoVENKAMP,
supra note 41, at 368-69 ("Any demonstrated cost reduction that results
from the way an arrangement of items is manufactured or sold should
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using contract to limit the discretion of purchasers-are not recognized under this approach. 97 Indeed, as noted earlier, one leading treatise states that, in determining whether an innovative
bundle produces efficiencies and should thus be deemed a single
product, courts should ask whether purchasers could replicate the
bundle and its benefits themselves.98 In so doing, this treatise
ignores the question whether purchasers possess the information
or incentive to make the proper choice. 99 As a result, so long as
create an inference that the combination is a single product. Such 'tie ins'
should generally be legal, even if the seller is a monopolist.") (emphasis
added). Despite the qualifying language ("generally"), Professor Hovenkamp does not explain when such ties should be unlawful.
97
In re Data General Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D.
Cal.), provides a prime example of the disparate treatment of technological and contractual efficiencies in this context. There the defendant
required customers who purchased its operating systems also to purchase
its central processing units (CPUs), even though its OS would function
on other CPUs. The defendant claimed that its operating system and CPU
were a single product, invoking posttransactional efficiencies. For
instance, the defendant asserted that the OS "will not function reliably
when used with foreign CPUs and [that] it is extremely difficult to service [defendant's] software when used with foreign CPUs." !d. at 1106.
While the court agreed that "these considerations are relevant to the ultimate determination of whether the tie-in is unlawful," it held that such
considerations were properly taken "into account as affirmative, business
justification defenses rather than [by] folding them into the separate
products issue." !d.

98

See

AREEDA ET AL.,

supra note 50, 111746, at 227.

99
For instance, this treatise concludes that International Salt's bundle of its salt dispensing machine and salt did not constitute an innovative, single product, "even if defendant's machine worked better with his
salt" because "the customer was no less able to put the items together
than the defendant." !d. 111746, at 227 (emphasis added); see International Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 397-98 (rejecting assertion that tie of salt to
salt dispensing machine was necessary to protect goodwill associated
with machine). In so doing, the treatise does not address whether International Salt's customers would have the information and incentive necessary to employ the appropriate sort of salt. This approach, of course,
replicates that taken by courts hostile to affirmative defenses. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-84 (asserting that tying is not necessary to
protect a seller's goodwill where other vendors "could" produce substi-
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items are technologically separate, they constitute separate products, and are subjected to the hostility of the per se rule, even if
uniting them contractually produces posttransactional efficiencies.Joo Thus, while the test proposed for innovative bundles discards one price-theoretic assumption-universal production
functions-it retains price theory's hostility toward posttransactional efficiencies. Some consistency is achieved, as the generous
attitude toward universal efficiencies is extended to some benefits
realized by particular firms. This extension is limited, however,
reaching only those bundles that are innovations, and only those
innovations that bring technological benefits.

tutes for tied item of sufficient quality); Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at
51-52 (finding that less restrictive alternatives would further franchisor's
interest where other manufacturers "could" produce substitutes for the
tied product). Cf Meese, supra note 29, at 75-81 (showing that purchasers may not purchase appropriate tied item even if vendors are willing and able to provide it).
1oo To be sure, these scholars purport to distinguish between reductions in production costs and reductions in transaction costs, treating each
as cognizable efficiencies that can justify a finding that two items are in
fact a single product. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1741, at 182;
HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 367 (same). However, it is clear that, in
employing the phrase "transaction costs," these authors are referring not
to posttransaction costs, such as opportunism, but instead pretransaction
costs, such as sales expenses. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50,
1]1741, at 182; HoVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 369 (referring to "cost
reductions" derived from the way in which items are "manufactured or
sold"). These pre transaction costs, of course, are the sort of technological
efficiencies traditionally recognized by the price-theoretic paradigm.
Compare Carl Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & EcoN.
141. 144-47 (1979) (distinguishing between various definitions of transaction costs).

96

The antitrust bulletin

IV. Innovative bundles in cyberspace: toward
a rule of reason standard
A. Two cheers for consistency: the D.C. Circuit's generous
treatment of innovative bundles

Litigation over the application of the 1994 consent decree to
Microsoft's Windows 95/IE bundle highlighted the shortcomings
of both the separate demand test and technological tying doctrine.
It seems clear under the separate demand test that Windows 95
and IE 3.0 and 4.0 were distinct products and thus not properly
treated as integrated within the meaning of the 1994 decree.IOI
There was apparently a separate demand for Internet browsers.
Microsoft itself once sold browsers and operating systems separately, and other makers of operating systems continue to do the
same. 1o2 Under Jefferson Parish and subsequent case law, it seems
IOI Assuming, of course, that tying law supplied the meaning of "integrated." See note 23, supra and accompanying text (describing D.C. Circuit's reliance upon tying law for its conclusion that the two items were
integrated and thus outside the terms of the decree).
102
See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 940-41; Plaintiffs' Response to
Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 45-46, 56 (arguing that
other OS makers offer OEMs a choice of browsers). Microsoft apparently
does not dispute this, instead arguing that no firm offers operating systems without also providing Web browsing functionality. See Microsoft's
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, at 34-36. Even if all OS
makers do require OEMs to purchase a browser, that does not preclude a
finding of separate demand. No hospital, for instance, performs operations without anesthesia. Still, the Supreme Court found a separate
demand for anesthesiologists because some hospitals, at least, allowed
patients to choose their own anesthesiologist. See Jefferson Parish, 466
U.S. at 22-23.
The United States also makes much of the fact that Microsoft offers
IE separately, on a stand-alone basis, directly to consumers. See, e.g.,
Plaintiffs' Response to Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment, at
52-53. Such separate marketing, however, does not appear independently
relevant. An automotive company may well market batteries, spark plugs,
etc. separately, to consumers who have purchased cars elsewhere. Such
separate marketing, however, would not suggest that, for instance, spark
plugs and automobiles are separate products.
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clear that separate sale of Windows 95 and Internet Explorer was
efficient with the result that they were separate products. 103
To be sure, Microsoft argued that the combination of Windows
95 and its browser was an innovation, i.e., that certain OS
functionalities were not available if a different browser was
employed. 104 Thus, it continued, the two products were "integrated" within the meaning of the decree, a result supported by
technological tying doctrine. Yet, even if this doctrine survived
Jefferson Parish, it did not save entirely Microsoft's bundle.
While the Windows 95/IE 3.0 bundle was properly characterized
as "technological," Microsoft provided Windows 95 and IE 4.0 on
separate disks, and OEMs could have achieved the benefits of
combining these two items just as readily as could Microsoft, by
choosing to purchase IE and installing it. 105 Microsoft's contractual requirement to do so, it seems, added nothing to the functional benefits of combining the two items.
Despite these obstacles, the D.C. Circuit still suggested that
both bundles were integrated products within the meaning of the
decree. In light of the various anomalies that beset current doctrine, this is not surprising. No doubt the court realized that its
opinion would be relevant outside the context of the consent
decree and that a conclusion that the two items were not integrated could subject similar software bundles to per se treatment
and the accompanying hostility to any efficiency claims. Moreover, the facts before the court made it quite plain that bundleto3
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-21; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at
462-63. Cf. PSI, Inc., 104 F.3d at 816-17 (concluding that circuit boards
were not a single product because some firms sold component parts of
such boards separately); Allen-Myland, Inc., 33 F.3d at 214.

See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950-51. See also Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, at 27-29 (describing various
benefits purportedly created by bundle of Windows 98 and Internet
Explorer).
114

ws See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1746b, at 229 ("To find a new
product, the items of software must operate better when bundled together
by the seller than they would if they were distributed on different
diskettes and installed by the buyer.").
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generated efficiencies need not be universally realized to be real.
The separate demand test, with its price-theoretic assumption of
static, universal production functions seemed poorly suited to an
industry where product upgrades are released on an annual basis.
Still, while bolstering Microsoft's assertion that Windows
95/IE 3.0 was an integrated product, rejection of the separate
demand test did not by itself suggest that the Windows 95/IE 4.0
bundle was similarly integrated, as consumers were capable of
combining the two items themselves. Again, however, the facts
before the court seemed to call into question the distinction
between pre- and posttransactional efficiencies. The court could
not believe that the result under the decree or tying doctrine must
turn on "which firm's employees should run particular disks or
CD-ROMs," that is, on whether the benefits in question were generated before or after the software left the boundaries of the
firm. 106 As the court observed: "software code by its nature is susceptible to division and combination in a way that physical products are not." 107 It was therefore feasible, the court said, to divide
any particular software program into two aggregations of code,
and to distribute each aggregation on separate disks. The mere
fact that programs could be so bifurcated should not render what
was otherwise one product two.I 08 Concomitantly, the court said,
the law should recognize those efficiencies that might result from
uniting two items after they left the boundaries of the firm.Io9
Thus, it concluded, an innovative bundle-even a bundle created
by contract-should be considered a single product unless it
produced no benefits or was created solely for anticompetitive
purposes. 110
106

See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 951.

107

See id.

lOS

/d. at 951-52.

109

!d. at 950-52.

tto
!d. at 949 and n.12. See also Microsoft, 1998 Trade Cas. at
82,674-75 (employing this test to determine whether Windows 98 and IE
4.0 are separate products for tying purposes).
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The D.C. Circuit's approach has the undoubted virtue of consistency: nonuniversal benefits, including those that arise posttransaction, are placed on an equal footing with those that would
be captured by the separate demand test. Nevertheless, even under
this approach, noninnovative bundles will still be subject to the
per se rule whenever there is a separate demand for their components.111 At any rate, uniformity does not by itself recommend the
approach adopted by the court. After all, there is more than one
uniform rule that could be applied to efficiency-creating bundles;
one could, for instance, subject all bundles-even those universally adopted-to rule of reason scrutiny. The ultimate question
posed by the unraveling of the separate demand test, then, is not
whether efficiencies should be assessed under a uniform standard,
but, instead, which uniform standard to adopt. The most logical
candidates seem to be (1) extending the generous treatment
accorded universal bundles to all beneficial bundles, or (2) subjecting all bundles to traditional rule of reason scrutiny. Under the
latter approach, proof that a bundle generates anticompetitive
harm would establish prima facie illegality, shifting a burden of
production to the proponent of the bundle. 112
Of course, this fundamental choice was not before the court in
any practical sense. Given the decree's exception for integrated
products as well as Supreme Court precedent, the D.C. Circuit
was in no position to declare all bundles-even those universally
adopted-subject to rule of reason scrutiny. Such a pronouncement would have been tantamount to a repudiation of the requirement that two products be present before an unlawful tie can be
found. Still, nothing compelled the court to extend the generous
treatment accorded to universal bundles to those that, while beneficial, were only adopted by some market participants. More precisely, the court could have subjected innovative bundles to closer
scrutiny, leaving for another day-and another court-the question how to treat universal bundles in a postprice theory world.
III
See notes 32-39, supra and accompanying text (describing varying standards lower courts apply to attempts to justify ties).

m See, e.g., IX AREEDA, supra note 50, 11111728-29 (describing rule
of reason as applied in tying context).
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Still, because the D.C. Circuit was writing in the shadow of a
per se rule hostile even to beneficial ties, one might argue, true
rule of reason treatment was not an option, and the court's
approach was appealing as a matter of second best, particularly in
an environment in which a parallel Sherman Act suit was underway. In that litigation, it should be noted, the government has
relied explicitly on the per se rule, despite its shaky economic
foundations. 113 Thus, the D.C. Circuit's opinion can be seen as a
return to those pre-Jefferson Parish decisions that circumvented
the per se rule through manipulation of the single product test. 114
Yet, the logic of the court's approach to the single product test
cannot be limited to the per se context; it would apply even if ties
were subjected only to rule of reason scrutiny.m Moreover, had
the court looked beyond the precise issue before it, i.e., the mean113
See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 47. At one level, the government's reliance on the per se rule is
unexceptional. The rule is, after all, "the law." Still, in other contexts, the
government has refrained from enforcing the antitrust laws to the full
extent allowed by extant case law, choosing to underenforce those precedents no longer supported by sound economic theory. See William Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Common
Law Nature of Antitrust, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661 (1982) Gustifying such a
flexible approach); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust
Law, 60 TEx. L. REv. 705, 711 (1982) (noting that, during the Carter
administration, the antitrust division "refused to enforce the RobinsonPatman Act at all and based [this] refusal on an economic approach that
amounted to nothing more than a disagreement with the Congress that
enacted the statute."). Cf. Meese, supra note 29, at 86-94 (arguing that
advances in economic theory have undermined economic premises of the
per se rule). Ironically, then, the government's stubborn adherence to the
per se rule may well lead the D.C. Circuit to the other extreme, i.e., a
finding that the Windows/IE bundle is a single product, despite a separate
demand for the two items.
114
Cf. Principe, 631 F.2d at 308-10; Dehydrating Process Co., 292
F.2d at 655-57.

11 5
See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, ~ 1742a-d (concluding that
determination that two items are a single product should also preclude
tying analysis under rule of reason). See also Meese, supra note 29, at
86-94 (arguing that tying contracts should be analyzed under the rule of
reason).
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ing of "integrated product" under the consent decree, it may have
found the doctrinal tools necessary to construct something like a
rule of reason test in substance if not in form. To be precise, the
court could have rejected Microsoft's argument that the mere
presence of plausible benefits established that the Windows 95/IE
bundle was integrated within the meaning of the decree and
instead adopted a more discriminating analysis along the lines of
the rule of reason. 11 6 At the same time, the court could have signaled that, under the Sherman Act, Microsoft would be free to
justify any tie, even one purportedly deemed per se unlawfu1. 117
To be sure, such an approach would have been controversial in
light of the Supreme Court's hostility to business justification
defenses.ns The approach the court actually took-finding an
integrated product despite a separate demand for Internet
browsers-was equally controversial.H9

l1 6
Cf. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 958-59 (Wald, J., dissenting) (arguing
that court should determine whether a bundle is integrated by asking
"whether the resulting product confers benefits on the consumer that justify a product's bridging of two formerly separate markets").
117
See, e.g., Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1348-51 (affirming jury's finding that franchise tie was justified). Of course, adoption of a generous
business justification defense would not entirely replicate a rule of reason
analysis, as a plaintiff could still establish a prima facie case simply by
showing a tie and market power. See Meese, supra note 29, at 12-21
(showing that modern per se rule depends on presumption that ties
obtained by a monopolist are "forced" on purchasers and that such forcing produces anticompetitive effects); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at
12-15 (explaining that purpose of per se rule is to identify instances in
which ties are "forced" on purchasers). However, proof that the tie creates significant benefits will shift to the plaintiff the burden of establishing that the tie's harms outweigh its benefits. See AREEDA ET AL., supra
note 50, 11 I 760e2, f. Such proof is not possible absent actual evidence of
anticompetitive effect. !d. Adoption of properly calibrated business justification defenses, then, would move tying a doctrine a long way toward a
de facto rule of reason standard.

llx

See notes 32-39, supra and accompanying text.

ll'•
See Microsoft, I 998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,672-74 (taking issue with
D.C. Circuit's rejection of the separate demand test).
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B. Constructing a rule of reason test for innovative bundles
It seems likely that the D.C. Circuit will get a second chance
to address this question. Shortly before the D.C. Circuit issued its
opinion, the government filed a Sherman Act suit, challenging not
only the Windows 95/IE bundle, but also the release of Windows
98, which Microsoft combined with IE 4.0. Unlike the Windo~s
95/IE 4.0 bundle, which was accomplished by contract, the Win.:
dows 98/IE combination was accomplished through software
code. Indeed, Microsoft has claimed that the two items are so
integrated that removal of the code that provides browser functionality would "do serious violence to the operating system" as
well. 120 Because this combination generates significant benefits,
Microsoft continues, the Windows 98/IE bundle is properly
deemed a single product.I2I

In so arguing, of course, Microsoft is asking for treatment
more lenient than the rule of reason. Such scrutiny, however, is
the norm and not the exception in antitrust analysis; departure
from this standard requires concrete justification. 122 Of course, the
single product test is itself more lenient than the rule of reason in
those instances in which bundling is universal. Extending such
leniency to cases in which bundling is not universal, however,
itself requires justification; indeed, the absence of such a justification may call the leniency of the single product test into question.
Courts and scholars have offered various rationales for extending this deferential treatment to innovative bundles. In particular,
it is said, rule of reason scrutiny for technological ties would be
subject to a high risk of error and thus deter technological
120
See Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment,
at 28 ("Internet Explorer technologies are even more deeply integrated
into Windows 98 than they were in Windows 95."); id. at 32 ("[T]here is
no distinct product called Internet Explorer that can be separated from
Windows 98 without doing serious violence to the operating system.").

See Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment,
at 27-33.
121

See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics, 485 U.S.
717, 723-24 (1988).
122
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progress.m Judges, some courts and scholars have said, simply do
not possess the requisite expertise to second-guess decisions
involving product design. 124 The D.C. Circuit, of course, relied
precisely upon this rationale in rejecting the separate demand
test.I25
This argument does not appear persuasive. The difficulties
inherent in balancing can just as well support a quite different
result, namely, liability upon any showing of significant anticompetitve effect. 126 Wisely, however, antitrust courts have generally
avoided each of these extremes, often engaging in the very sort of
balancing that some reject as beyond judicial competence. Where,
for instance, a seller demonstrates that a vertical restraint produces procompetitive benefits, or a dealer shows that such a
restraint works anticompetitive harm, courts do not end the
inquiry. Instead, they balance benefits against the harms produced
by the arrangement.m This is so, it should be noted, even though
123 See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950 n.13 ("[T]he limited competence
of courts to evaluate high-tech product designs and the high cost of error
should make them wary of second-guessing the claimed benefits of a particular design decision."); Foremost Pro Color, 703 F.2d at 543;
Response of Carolina, Inc., 537 F.2d at 1330; Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp.
at 347; see also AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1746, at 226.
124
Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950-51, n.13; Response of Carolina, Inc.,
537 F.2d at 1330; Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 347. See also AREEDA ET
AL., supra note 50, 1]1746, at 226 ("[where innovations are involved] tribunals could review such arguments as an efficiency defense, but they
lack the technical expertise to judge product design. As a result, allowing
tying inquiry to proceed is likely to result in errors that would deter
socially desirable innovations and variations in product design."); HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 369 ("No court could balance the social losses
that a forced combination sale may impose against potential social
gains.").
12s

See Microsoft, 147 F. 3d at 950-53.

See, e.g., United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.IO (1972)
(suggesting that per se prohibition is preferable to "rambling through the
wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach").
12 6

m

(1977).

See, e.g., Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52-59
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the benefits of such arrangements, such as the amelioration of
opportunism or the enhancement of goodwill, are not subject to
neat quantification and comparison with anticompetitive effects.l28
Similarly, courts do not condemn a merger simply because it creates market power, or immunize it because it produces efficiencies.
In short, the mere fact that a transaction or contract generates
benefits and thus would have been adopted absent an expectation
of market power does not ordinarily place it beyond antitrust
scrutiny. 129 Instead, where such an arrangement produces market
power, courts and the enforcement agencies balance the harm
flowing from that power against any benefits produced by the
transaction. 13° Indeed, the efficiencies ascribed to mergers or other
contractual arrangements are often the very sort of (technological)
benefits-reduction in production costs or creation of an improved
product-that are ascribed to innovative bundles. 13 1 There is no
12&
See Oliver Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions:
Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 953, 993 n.135 (1979) (noting that "a rigorous demonstration" of
the benefits produced by vertical restraints "is not apt to be feasible").
See also Meese, supra note 29, at 79-80 (showing that goodwill benefits
of bundling can extend beyond bundled products to include any product
bearing the seller's trademark).
129
In Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
441 U.S. 1 (1979), for instance, the Court relied, in part, on the fact that
small performing rights societies offered the very sort of blanket license
there under challenge. 441 U.S. at 22-25. While the fact that this mechanism was acceptable to a "large part of the market" militated against per
se illegality, it did not, in the Court's eyes anyway, militate toward per se
legality.
13o
See, e.g., F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206,
1222-23 (lith Cir. 1991); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F.
Supp. 1064, 1084-85 (D. Del. 1991).
131
See, e.g., University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1223 (evaluating
claim that transaction would eliminate unnecessary duplication of
productive assets and thus lower production costs); United Tote, 768
F. Supp. at 1084-85 (scrutinizing and rejecting claim that merger was
justified because it would lead to "improved product innovation efforts");
BMI, 441 U.S. at 16-25 (holding that blanket license agreement that
"substantially lower[s] costs" essentially created a new product and was
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apparent reason why courts are capable of balancing good and
bad effects in one context but not the other. Indeed, where noninnovative bundles are involved, courts freely evaluate business
justifications, sometimes making difficult judgments about technological interoperability.J32
Courts should not take a different approach simply because
innovation is involved. Innovation can take several forms: some
contractual and some technological. Indeed, contractual innovations often involve the integration of functions naturally left to
separate firms. 133 Antitrust courts, of course, routinely review
such innovations, even though economists or firms themselves
may not fully understand the purpose of the arrangement in question.134 To be sure, the novelty of a contractual arrangement connproperly subject to rule of reason scrutiny). Cf. /LC Peripherals Leasing
Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 230-32 (declaring combination of disk drive and
head/disk assembly a single product because it produced "larger on-line
storage capacity" than had previously been available and eliminated
necessity of an automatic disk loader).

m See, e.g., Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1348-51 (affirming jury verdict that
tie was least restrictive means of realizing significant benefits); N.W.
Controls v. Outboard Marine Corporation, 333 F. Supp. 493, 504-06 (D.
Del. 1971); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545,
559-61 (E.D. Pa. 1960, aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (finding
that bundle of community antenna equipment was properly treated as a
single product for a limited period, after which it was an unjustified tie)).
See generally, AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1760d, at 367-69 (endorsing this level of scrutiny where sellers attempt to justify tie).
m See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (reviewing
NCAA's policy of concerted output decisions); BM/, 441 U.S. at passim
(reviewing blanket license agreement whereby competitors set uniform
royalty); Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at passim (reviewing agreement allocating to the manufacturer control over territory in which dealer distributed its goods). Of course, the contracts at issue in NCAA, BMI and
Continental T.V. were not innovations by the time they reached the
Supreme Court. Presumably, however, the Court would have subjected
each arrangement to rule of reason scrutiny even if they had been challenged immediately after they were adopted.
D4
Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks,
76 GEo. L.J. 305, 308 (1987) ("Often it takes a decade or more to deter-
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sels against per se condemnation, as such treatment will deprive
society permanently of the benefits of the practice. 135 Such uncertainty, however, does not preclude scrutiny under the more forgiving rule of reason, even though, by its nature, such review
involves second-guessing business judgments. If antitrust courts
can second-guess technological efficiencies and contractual innovations, it is not clear why they cannot scrutinize technological
innovations.
Indeed, in other contexts, courts engage in equally complex
inquiries asking, for instance, whether drugs are designed reasonably.136 More to the point, courts sometimes determine whether
software met general standards of merchantability. 137 Of course,
the mere fact that the courts appropriately scrutinize business
decisions in one context does not ipso facto establish that they
should do so in another. 138 Market mechanisms that discipline
mine what a business practice really does."); cf CoASE, supra note 59, at
67 (noting that most business practices are, from the perspective of an
economist, "ununderstandable").
135
HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 436 ("[T]he continuing case for a
rule of reason [in the case of vertical restraints] rests on the premise that
we need to know more before we can move to a more categorical rule,
one way or the other."); Easterbrook, supra note 134, at 309 (noting that
judicial condemnation of a practice can deprive society of its benefits
indefinitely). See also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,
263 (1963) ("We need to know more than we do about the actual impact
of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they [should be
per se illegal].").
136
See, e.g., Castrignano v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775,
781-83 (R.I. 1988); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410,
415-16 (Colo. 1986).
137
See, e.g., Neilson Business Equipment Ctr. v. Small V. Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172-76 (Del. 1987). See also Advent Systems LTD v.
Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675-76 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that license
of software was a "good" subject to merchantability provisions of the
U.C.C.); NMP Corp. v. Parametric Technology Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536,
1541-42 (N.D. Okl. 1997) (same).
138
See FRAI'K H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE EcoNOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 93-94 (1991).
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sellers may be present in one class of cases but not in another,
thus justifying disparate treatment. 139 Theory suggests, however,
that these mechanisms are more powerful in the sales than in the
antitrust context. Most product manufacturers, after all, do not
possess significant market power and even monopolists have
incentives to design well-functioning products. Where, on the
other hand, a plaintiff can establish that a bundle will create or
augment market power, there is even more reason for judicial
scrutiny than there is in the sales context.I 40
Those who would depart from rule of reason scrutiny for innovative bundles, then, have not made a compelling case. To be
sure, the collapse of the price-theoretic paradigm suggests that
these bundles can produce significant benefits, even if the practice
has not been adopted throughout the market. Still, the mere existence of such benefits should not immunize the arrangement in
question. Instead, whether technological or contractual, it seems,
innovative bundles should be analyzed under the rule of reason. 141
13Y
!d. at 94-97 (arguing that judicial deference to business judgments
is justified by presence of market mechanisms that discipline conduct of
corporate officers and directors).
14 °
Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 134, at 306 (arguing that courts
should scrutinize business decisions more carefully where firms allegedly
"injure consumers, who cannot retaliate readily").

Some may perceive that the argument made here proves too much,
i.e., may justify abandoning the separate product test altogether. It may
be that the argument made here applies with equal force to the separate
product test, at least to the extent that such a test focuses on the benefits
of joint packaging. Preservation of tying law in its current form, however, should not be the summum bonum of antitrust policy. As the Court
said in Jefferson Parish:
Of course, the Sherman Act does not prohibit "tying"; it prohibits
"contract[s] . . . in restraint of trade." Thus, in a sense the question whether this case involves "tying" is beside the point. The
legality of petitioners' conduct depends on its competitive consequences, not on whether it can be labeled "tying." If the competitive consequences of this arrangement are not those to which the
per se rule is addressed, then it should not be condemned irrespective of its label.
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21 n.34.
14 1

108

The antitrust bulletin

In fact, some might argue that rule of reason scrutiny will
actually protect and enhance innovation. Where software competition is concerned, innovation is the name of the game, and such
innovation requires the innovator to incur sunk costs. It is conceivable, however, that a dominant firm could employ a bundling
strategy to deprive rivals-or potential rivals-of access to a
customer base necessary to support the sunk costs of innovation.142
Indeed, fear that Microsoft is engaged in something like the
anticompetitive strategy just described led the United States and
several states to challenge the (technological) Windows 98/IE
bundle. Microsoft's grip on the OS market, it is argued, is driven
in part by the network effects that characterize the design and use
of operating system software. 143 The value of any operating system increases along with the number of consumers who employ
that system, as a large user base will support a richer variety of
complementary application software. 144 Ordinarily, application
software will only function with one particular operating system
or "platform." As a result, writers of such applications must
decide which platform to write for. Because the vast majority of
PC users possess a Microsoft OS, most application firms have
chosen to write software that is compatible with Windows. Other
things being equal then, Windows is more attractive to consumers
than other operating systems, as Windows will support a wider
array of applications. 145 Any potential challenger to Microsoft's
large share of the OS market must be willing to incur the sunk
142
Cf. Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J.
209, 224-26 (1986) (describing possible strategy whereby manufacturer
deprives rivals of outlets through exclusive dealing contracts).
14 3

See supra note 13, Declaration of DavidS. Sibley, 111111-17.

144
See generally David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, A Guide
to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, 10 ANTITRUST 36, 36 (Spring
1996) (concluding that network effects can "arise indirectly . . . when
additional network users spur the demand for complementary products").

See Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1452 (reproducing statement of Professor Kenneth Arrow to this effect).
145
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costs necessary to provide a significantly superior product or, in
the alternative, to enter at a scale sufficient to induce application
writers to provide a meaningful array of software.
Enter Java, a programming language developed by Sun
Microsystems. Applications written in this language can run on
more than one operating system, with the result that application
writers need not confine their product to a single platform. 14 6 So,
for instance, software written in Java could run on both Windows
and IBM's OS/2. In order for a Java application to function, however, it must be translated by software, coexisting with an operating system, known as a Java Virtual Machine (JVM).t 47 Netscape,
it is alleged, is the most important distributional channel for the
JVM; an application written in the Java language will run on any
personal computer that includes Netscape. 148 By redesigning and
bundling Internet Explorer with its OS, the government argues,
Microsoft is attempting to drive Netscape from the market, thus
making it more costly to distribute the JVM. 149 This strategy, it is
said, will deter application makers from writing applications for
non-Windows environments, raising the cost of competitive OS
entry, and thwarting innovation. Proof that such a strategy is
occurring and will be successful should establish a prima facie
146
See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,670; Sun Microsystems,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1301, 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
("JAVA technology comprises a standardized application programming
environment that affords software developers the ability to create and
distribute a single version of programming code which is capable of
operating on many different, otherwise incompatible, system platforms
and browsers.").
1-17
See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,670; Sun Microsystems,
999 F. Supp. at 1303 ("A specific interpreter or virtual machine is needed
for each computer CPU on which the JAVA program is run.").
1-1s
See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,670. Moreover, it appears
that Netscape itself is a platform to which some applications can be written. /d.

See id. at 82,671-72 (describing government's contention); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 142, at 226 (arguing that distribution is
best characterized as an input).
149
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case under the rule of reason. 1so Moreover, proof that the bundle
in question produces some plausible benefits and thus would be a
single product under the D.C. Circuit's test does not, as a logical
matter, preclude the presence of such anticompetitive effects or
suggest that the bundle is procompetitive on balance. 1s1
Indeed, the very plasticity that the D.C. Circuit invoked suggests that such a strategy would readily escape something less
than rule of reason scrutiny. It is not particularly difficult, it
seems, to design software applications in a way that creates benefits of functioning with an operating system. 152 If this is so, an OS
firm that wishes to disadvantage makers of a particular sort of
application can simply redesign its own application, point to benefits created by that redesign, and insure-through contract or
technology-that OEMs or consumers purchase the application
along with the OS.
1so See Meese, supra note 38, at 145-46 (describing strategy whereby
franchisor employs tying contracts that raise the prices of its competitors'
inputs). This is not to say that a plaintiff could establish a prima facie
case under such a theory simply by establishing that Microsoft's bundle
would drive Netscape from the market. A plaintiff would also have to
establish that alternate channels of JVM distribution are not sufficient to
establish a sufficient base of users of applications written in Java. See
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 142, at 225-26 (concluding that strategy of depriving competitors of distribution channels cannot be anticompetitive if alternate methods of distribution remain). Moreover, a plaintiff
would also have to establish that predatory counter-strategies by
Netscape and others would not thwart Microsoft's tactics. See id. at
268-72. Such a strategy, for instance, could involve Netscape's purchase
of alternative vehicles of exclusive distribution for its browser. See id. at
268-69. Netscape's recently announced merger with America Online
could be characterized as just such a strategy.
15 1
Cf Meese, supra note 38, at 141-43 (showing that existence of
benefits rebuts presumption that contract has been "forced" on purchaser).

152
See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 961 ("It is difficult to imagine how
Microsoft could not conjure up some technological advantage for any
currently separate software product it wished to 'integrate' into the operating system.") (Wald, J., dissenting).
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Of course, the mere fact that the government can make out a
prima facie case against Microsoft does not settle the question
whether a rule of reason test will encourage more innovation than
it will deter. Defenders of the D.C. Circuit's test would be quick
to point out that laying out a prima facie case does not by itself
establish that a bundle is a net harm to society, and they would be
correct. To begin with, courts may mistakenly conclude that the
bundle will generate or protect market power. Moreover, even
those bundles that do generate such power may be efficient on
balance. Given these possibilities, as well as courts' traditional
hostility to justifications of tying contracts, reasonable minds
could certainly conclude that, despite the possibility of anticompetitive behavior outlined above, a rule of reason test for innovative bundles could in the end fetter more innovation than it would
encourage.
The challenge for those seeking a first best antitrust policy,
then, is to construct a rule of reason test that provides meaningful
scrutiny without equating a prima facie case with per se illegality.
That is, unlike current tying doctrine, which views attempts at
justification with a jaundiced eye, a rule of reason for innovative
bundles would have to allow sellers to adduce evidence that (1)
the bundle does not, in fact, enhance a firm's market power and/or
(2) the benefits of the bundle outweigh its costs. Thus, courts
would have to abandon the presumption that a seller's possession
of market power by itself establishes anticompetitive effects, as
well as their propensity to rely on the presence of less restrictive,
less effective alternatives.ts3
To be sure, gathering the information necessary to conduct
such a balance would be a difficult task, both for the parties and
the finder of fact. Moreover, reasonable minds can certainly ques153
As suggested earlier, any such softening of the per se rule will
face opposition from the United States. See note 113, supra. Indeed, the
United States has explicitly argued that it need not prove anticompetitive
effects in order to establish that the bundle is unlawful. See Plaintiffs'
Joint Response to Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 48 n.22
("Because Microsoft's forced licensing of Internet Explorer is unlawful
per se, anticompetitive effects are presumed.").
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tion the competence of courts to compare the anticompetitive
effects of a practice against its benefits. 154 Indeed, rule of reason
balancing is notoriously generous to defendants.JSS Still, in some
instances anyway, courts can structure rule of reason analysis so
as to minimize the costs and maximize the accuracy of such an
inquiry. For instance, where a bundle is purely contractual, courts
can often forgo further inquiry, leaving the market to determine
whether the bundle in question is reasonable. Of course, markets
sometimes fail, and the point of many ties is to overcome such
failures by contract.I56 Price theory, and the antitrust doctrine that
it bred, fell short precisely because each failed to acknowledge
the ability of nonstandard contracts to overcome market failure;
the D.C. Circuit sought to remedy this shortcoming by recognizing the possibility of posttransactional benefits. 157 Still, once a
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, there is no reason to
presume that the bundle under scrutiny is designed to overcome
market failure. Instead, a seller that wishes to justify a contractual
bundle on efficiency grounds should first demonstrate that, in
fact, the market in question is prone to failure. More precisely, the
proponent of the bundle must show that transaction costs, that is,
the cost of relying upon the buyer to choose which complementary item to employ, characterize the relationship in question. 1ss
Such costs, of course, will include information costs and the possibility of opportunism, i.e., behavior that does not maximize the
joint welfare of the parties. 159 Failing such an explanation, there is
15 4
See Rothery Storage v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 229 n.11
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (arguing that there is no "useable formula" to
"weigh procompetitive effects against anticompetitive effects").
155
See, e.g., HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 431 ("The rule of reason
has come close to creating complete non-liability for non-price
restraints.").
156

See Meese, supra note 29, at 59-66.

157

See notes 106-10, supra, and accompanying text.

15 8
See Meese, supra note 29, at 56-57, 61-66 (defining such costs
and describing how they can be present in a buyer-seller relationship).

159
Thus, in order to convince the court to balance procompetitive
against anticompetitive effects, Microsoft would have to show that OEMs
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no rationale for contractual restraint, and courts should not entertain evidence that the bundle's benefits outweigh its costs. Instead,
purchasers should be left to determine whether the bundle creates
any net benefits, that is, whether, adjusting for price, the bundle is
superior to the combination of the seller's product and a product
sold by the seller's competitor. A court should not allow itself or a
monopolist to substitute its judgment for the decentralized process
of information production and dissemination that characterizes a
well-functioning market. Where, on the other hand, the market in
question is prone to failure, courts should engage in balancing. 16o

It would be tempting to take a similar approach, that is, to
declare such a bundle unlawful whenever the market functions
either cannot understand the benefits of the Windows 98/IE bundle, see
Dehydrating Process Co., 292 F.2d at 656-57, or in the alternative, that
they do not possess the requisite incentives to choose the most appropriate combination of OS and browser. Cf. Meese, supra note 38, at 117-20
(describing franchisee incentives to free ride). At first blush, it seems
Microsoft will find it difficult to make a case that such market failure is
present. Unlike customers in Dehydrating Process Co., for instance,
OEMs are technically sophisticated and likely understand the interworkings of various forms of software. Moreover, unlike franchisees, for
instance, OEMs seem to possess incentives to maximize the goodwill
associated with the product they distribute, namely, a package of equipment and software.
Such balancing should proceed even if unbundling would degrade
or destroy one of the bundled items. Cf. Microsoft's Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment, at 32 (arguing that Windows 98/IE bundle is not a tie because "there is no distinct product called Internet
Explorer that can be separated from Windows 98 without doing serious
violence to the operating system"). The mere fact that undoing a particular combination will damage its constituent parts does not establish that
the benefits of the bundle outweigh its anticompetitive effects. Moreover,
Microsoft apparently concedes that, where two items have purposely
been "bolted" together, they should be deemed separate products, even if
"unbolting" will damage one or both of the items. See Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, at 29; see also Microsoft,
147 F.3d at 949. There is no reason why the outcome in this context
should turn on the seller's intent or purpose. Even a well-intended bundle
may be unreasonable. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
u.s. 231, 238 (1918).
160
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well, where the bundle in question is technological in nature.
However, if the combination is truly technological, such a short
cut would not be warranted. For, in such cases, the seller may
claim that the technological nature of the combination itself produces the benefits in question, that is, that unbundling would
change the nature of the product or service. 161 In such cases,
courts will have no choice but to engage in more traditional balancing, comparing the benefits of the combination to the anticompetitive effects it creates.I62
This is not to say that any technological combination that
brings an improvement over prior combinations should lead courts
to engage in balancing. The improvement must be produced by
the technological integration, and not the result of coincidental
advances unrelated to that combination. 163 Where, on the other
hand, the very same improvements could be realized without technological combination, courts should apply the approach suggested above for contractual bundles, asking whether any market
failures preclude reliance upon purchasers' judgment. 164 Where
16 1
See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50,~ 1746b, at 227-28 (defining
innovative bundle as combination that cannot, for technical reasons, be
replicated by purchasers); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp., 448 F. Supp.
at 232 (evaluating technological combination of drive unit and head/disk
assembly that eliminated need for an automatic disk loading mechanism).
Cf Data General, 490 F. Supp. at 1108-09 (finding CPUs and memory
boards separate products where consumers removed defendant's board
and installed boards manufactured by competitors).

The distinction drawn here between technological and contractual
ties may appear to mirror the (unjustified) distinction between the two
drawn by technological tying doctrine. See notes 89-100, supra and
accompanying text. This is not the case, however. What is proposed here
is a uniform standard-rule of reason treatment-with differing methods
of implementation.
16 2

Cf Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Joint
Merger Guidelines, § 4.0 (only merger-specific efficiencies are cognizable to justify otherwise anticompetitive transaction).
163

Indeed, the plasticity on which the D.C. Circuit relied suggests
that many apparently technological bundles are best characterized as contractual, i.e., that software can be unbundled without eliminating the benefits of integration.
164
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no such failure is present, courts should deem technological
unbundling a less-restrictive alternative, and declare the bundle
unlawful.
In conducting this analysis, courts must take care to distinguish a contractual bundle from a truly technological bundle supported by ancillary contractual restraints. Thus, the fact that
Microsoft has prohibited OEMs from depriving consumers of
ready access to browser functionality does not transform an otherwise technological tie into a contractual one.'65 At first glance, the
presence of such a restriction would suggest that the underlying
bundle is contractual and should be analyzed as such. Absent a
market failure, after all, consumers are just as competent to decide
whether to unbundle as to bundle in the first place. In the present
case, however, the presence of this contractual restriction does not
preclude the possibility that the Windows 98/IE bundle is truly
technological in nature. According to Microsoft, anyway, actual
removal of the software code that provides browser functionality
will "degrade" the underlying operating system. 166 As a result,
because no OEM actually desires to injure the operating system,
the contracts in question merely prevent OEMs from interfering
with customers' access to the browser, by, for instance, hiding the
icon. Such interference, it should be noted, apparently does not
impair the underlying software code and thus does not deprive the
ultimate consumer of many of the purported benefits of technological integration. 167 Thus, while themselves subject to rule of reason
scrutiny as nonprice vertical restraints, the existence of such agreements does not preclude the possibility that the technological combination of Windows 98 and IE produces significant benefits. 168
165
See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,673-74 (distinguishing
technological tying cases on the grounds that Microsoft "took the further
step of contractually prohibiting OEMs from unbundling") (emphasis
supplied).

IM

See note 120, supra.

167

See note 8, supra.

16 h
If the government can establish a prima facie case that such agreements are anticompetitive, Microsoft will be required to adduce evidence
of procompetitive benefits. Here again, it seems proof that some market
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V. Conclusion
Antitrust should strive to distinguish beneficial arrangements
from those that do harm. A product of the applied price theory tradition, tying doctrine does not perform this task well. Bundles
that do not generate benefits for all market participants are treated
as distinct products, and the mere existence of market power,
without more, establishes that a combination of two products is
unlawful per se. While some lower courts have allowed sellers to
justify per se unlawful ties, the standards employed to evaluate
such justifications are unduly onerous, and tying law treats different efficiencies quite differently. Those realized universally will
place a bundle beyond scrutiny, while others will likely not be
recognized at all.
The D.C. Circuit's Microsoft opinion can be viewed as an
attempt to mitigate the harsh consequences of tying doctrine's disparate treatment of various sorts of efficiencies. By creating an
exception to the separate demand test for innovative bundles, the
court recognized that efficiencies need not be realized universally
to be real. Moreover, by entertaining proof of benefits not deemed
technological, the court recognized the existence of posttransactional benefits, so long slighted by the price-theoretic paradigm.
Still, the collapse of the price-theoretic paradigm did not itself
justify the standard announced by the D.C. Circuit. For, there is
another uniform standard the court could have applied: rule of
reason treatment. Unlike the D.C. Circuit's test, which would
immunize any bundle that produces significant benefits, such an
approach would balance such benefits against any anticompetitive
harms generated by the bundle. If applied in a rigorous manner,
such a test may actually encourage innovation.

failure prevents OEMs from, for instance, choosing to display the appropriate icon would be necessary.

